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Background: In January 2006, the Korean government implemented a copayment waiver policy for hospitalized
children under the age of 6 years to reduce the economic burden on patients. This policy was implemented from
2006 to 2007 in Korea and involved hospitalized children under the age of 6 years. The goal of this study is to
evaluate the effect of the copayment waiver policy on health insurance beneficiaries.
Methods: The change in medical service utilization before and after the policy implementation was analyzed using
data from the national health insurance corporation (NHIC) and compared with medical aid beneficiaries who were
already exempt from copayment. The “difference in difference” method was applied to determine the net effect of
the copayment waiver policy.
Results: The net effect of policy implementation on NHIC beneficiaries was unclear by the “difference in difference”
method because the number of inpatient days and hospital expenditure after policy implementation showed
opposite results. The copayment waiver policy did not decrease the intensity of health care utilization when
compared with the medical aid beneficiaries group. Among the NHIC beneficiaries, patients who utilized medical
services for fatal disease and those with the low premiums group were more affected by the policy.
Conclusions: The net effect of copayment waiver policy remains unclear. Therefore, further studies are needed to
determine the effects of policies implemented to reduce the economic burden on patients, such as the herein-described
copayment waiver policy.
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Korea provides mandatory social health insurance from
the National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC) for
its entire population, with exception of the poorest 3-
5%, who are covered by medical aid [1]. The benefit
coverage for NHIC beneficiaries and medical aid benefi-
ciaries is identical. Korea’s national health insurance is
financed by premiums from insured and government
subsidies. In 2007, premiums occupied 83.4% of NHIC
revenue and government subsidies occupied 14.1% [2].
For industrial workers which include government em-
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orproportional to wage and it is equally shared by the em-
ployer and employee. The contribution rate of industrial
worker was 5.08% of wage in 2008. For self-employed, the
premium is imposed by a formula based on gender, in-
come and property to reflect actual income. Additionally,
NHIC beneficiaries pay a copayment [3]. In case of out-
patient care, copayment ranges from 30% of clinic visit to
60% of higher level general hospital. For the inpatients
case, the copayment rate is 20%. For some diseases such
as cancer and catastrophic event that copayment exceeds
$2900 dollar, discount and ceiling for copayment was
applied. But this is only applied small portion of total
hospitalization case [2].
Medical aid is funded by the central and local govern-
ments, allowing the beneficiaries of medical aid to pay a
relatively lower copayment [4]. NHIC remuneratedhis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited.
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ies of medical aid who are less than 18 years old do not
have a copayment. However, elective procedures such
as cosmetic enhancement and surgery to end snoring
are excluded from the NHIC and medical aid benefit
coverage [3].
In January 2006, the Korean government implemented
a copayment waiver policy for hospitalized children
under the age of 6 years who are covered by NHIC with
the aim of minimizing the economic burden on patients.
The copayment for hospitalized children under the age
of 6 years was set at 0%; however, at the end of 2007, the
Korean government decided to stop the policy because
of the huge financial expenditure, and increased the
copayment rate for these children to 10% of the total
cost.
Many studies on health insurance policies and health
care utilization have been performed. For example, a study
on the expansion of the State Children’s Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP) in the United States, found that SCHIP
enrollment improved access to health care and increased
the quality of care, especially for children in low income
families [6,7]. In Korea, low income patients and users of
clinics are sensitive to the copayment rate [8]. Addition-
ally, the separation of drug prescriptions and dispersal in
Korea reportedly increased the public share of total health
expenditure [9]. However, the effect of the copayment
waiver policy on children under the age of 6 years has
not been evaluated. In addition, the studies on copayment
waiver are scarce as well.
The goal of this research is to evaluate the effect of the
copayment wavier policy during its 2 years of implementa-
tion. Because the beneficiaries of medical aid under the
age of 6 years were already exempt from copayment, the
copayment waiver policy included only the beneficiaries of
the NHIC. Therefore, this study compared the differences
between medical aid beneficiaries and NHIC beneficiaries
and aimed to reveal the net effect of the copayment waiver
policy on children. The NHIC beneficiaries were divided
into subgroups, and the authors attempted to determine
the differences in effect according to disease category and
income level, as measured by the NHIC premium level.
This study was conducted with consideration of the inter-
actions of the policy and its variables.
Methods
Data collection and classification
First, data on the inpatient NHIC beneficiaries from 0 to
5 years of age were collected. Data on patients hospitalized
before (1 August 2004 to 30 November 2005) and after
(1 February 2006 to 31 May 2007) implementation of
the policy was collected to assess the net effect of the
policy. The NHIC beneficiaries were subgrouped as two
groups −1) industrial worker and their dependents and 2)self-employed and their dependent. Data on inpatient care
of medical aid beneficiaries hospitalized from 0 to 5 years
were also collected during the same period to compare the
net effect of the policy.
Diseases were categorized as either fatal or non-fatal to
analyse the effects of each policy. Data from the National
Statistical Office in 2006 were used to classify fatal dis-
eases [10]. Forty-eight leading causes of death for children
aged 0 to 5 years were selected in order of frequency and
were considered to be fatal diseases
The premiums of the beneficiaries of NHIC were used
as the proxy indicators of income level to assess the effects
on NHIC beneficiaries according to income group. In
Korea’s NIH system, the premium level depends on the
income level of the beneficiary. Additionally, the house-
holds were divided into five groups of equal numbers of
subjects based on the premium level [3]. The effects of the
policy were measured by medical utilization. The number
of inpatient days per case, and the hospital expenditure
per case were used as the indictor of medical utilization.
The patients’ copayments and the costs covered by the
NHIC were included in the hospital expenditure. The
medical utilization of NHIC beneficiaries were compared
with those of medical aids group.
Data analysis
The “difference in difference is used to reduce the prob-
abilities of time-invariant omitted variables and time
trends by comparing results before the intervention and
after interruption and by comparing the intervention
group with the control group. The differences in the
intervention group before and after the intervention
should be compared with those of the control group be-
fore and after the intervention [11].
A regression equation was used to estimate the net ef-
fect of the policy. In the regression equation, individual
characteristics—including age, sex, premium level, and
disease characteristic (fatal or non-fatal)—were used as
independent variables. Intensity indices—such as the
number of inpatient days per case and hospital expenditure
per case—were used as dependent variables. The equation
used is shown below.
Si : ¼ αþ β1Xþ β2Cþ β3Dþ β4CDþ E
Si: the number of inpatient days per case, hospital
expenditure per case,logarithmic transformation
X: independent variables (age, sex, level of premium,
type of medical institute, fatality of the disease)
C: group variable (0 =medical aid group, 1 = national
health insurance group)
D: time variable (0 = copayment existence, before
Nov.30. 2005; 1 = after Feb.1, 2006, after the policy)
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of the copayment waiver policy
Indices of the intensity of medical use (Si), such as the
number of inpatient days per case and the hospital ex-
penditure per case were analyzed after logarithmic trans-
formation, because the data for this research were not
normally distributed. In this equation, β4: is the estimator
of “difference in difference.” The degree of medical use be-
tween the NHIC beneficiaries group and the medical aid
beneficiaries group was compared using the “difference in
difference” method.
Additionally, the effects of the policy among NHIC
beneficiaries according to disease and premium level
were analyzed with consideration of the interaction of
the policy and the stated variables. The patients with
fatal and non-fatal diseases were compared to create a
model with which to determine the effect of disease on
healthcare use. Patients with non-fatal diseases com-
prised one reference group, and patients with the highest
premiums (upper 20%) comprised another reference
group to determine the effect of premium level on policy
use. The Korean Won was converted to US dollars ac-
cording to the 2007 average exchange rate of 1 USD to
929.26 Won [12].
In this study, the data of NHIC which did not have per-
sonal identifier were used, and the use of data was ap-
proved by NHIC. This survey confirmed to the Declaration
of Helsinki as well as to local legislation. Statistical analysis
was performed using SAS version 9.1 (SAS institute Inc.
Cary, NC), and statistical significance level was set at 0.05.Table 1 Changes in medical utilization before and aftera copa
Total patients <6 years of age Total Inpatients <6 y
National Health Insurance Group (Total)
Before 429,666 535,129
After 699,254 891,278
Rate of Increase 62.7% 66.6%
National Health Insurance Group(Industrial worker)
Before 273,194 336,335
After 480,739 603,284
Rate of Increase 76.0% 79.4%
National Health Insurance Group(Self-employed)
Before 160251 198794
After 228610 287994




Rate of Increase 111.4% 114.9%
aBefore (2004.8.1-2005.11.30) and after (2006.2.1-2007.5.31).Results
Table 1 represents the changes in medical utilization
between 2004.8.1-2005.11.30 and 2006.2.1-2007.5.31. In
the NHIC beneficiaries group, the number of inpatient
days per case decreased from 6.37 to 5.96, and the hospital
expenditure per case decreased from $709.32 to $644.67.
In the medical aid beneficiaries group, the number of in-
patient days per case decreased from 13.48 to 10.53, and
hospital expenditure per case decreased from $2067.94 to
$1452.53. Among the NHIC beneficiaries group, the in-
dustrial worker group showed larger decrease.
The overall trends of intensity in medical utilization
among the NHIC beneficiaries are shown according to pre-
mium level in Table 2. The low premium group of NHIC
beneficiaries showed the most significant decrease in the
premium level after policy implementation (Table 2).
The results of applying a logarithm to the intensity of
medical utilization are shown in Table 3. The number of in-
patient days per case exhibited a 0.101 interaction coeffi-
cient between the NHIC beneficiaries group and policy
implementation. This value indicates that when analyzed
using the indicated logarithm (number of inpatient days
per case), the degree of decrease among the NHIC benefi-
ciaries after policy implementation was smaller than that of
the medical aid beneficiaries group. Regarding the hospital
expenditure per case, the “difference in difference” estima-
tor was −0.123, indicating that the degree of decrease in the
hospital expenditure, among the NHIC beneficiaries as ana-
lysed by the chosen logarithm (medical expense per case),
was greater than that among the medical aid beneficiaries.yment waiver policy implementation
















Table 2 Change in rate by premium level after policy implementation
Premium
Level
Inpatient days (%) Hospital expenditure (%)
Total Industrial worker Self-employed Total Industrial worker Self-employed
Low −9.0 −8.1 −11.6 −11.8 −10.2 −17.2
Low middle −6.1 −6.6 −4.8 −8.8 −10.7 −5.4
Middle −6.6 −6.7 −5.6 −10.4 −11.0 −9.0
High middle −4.0 −3.9 −3.5 −6.6 −8.0 −3.7
High −4.2 −3.7 −3.5 −8.2 −11.4 −4.0
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or fatality and the policy is shown in Table 4. The inter-
action coefficient between fatal disease and policy imple-
mentation was 0.093, indicating a statistically significant
interaction. This result indicates that use of the waiver
policy affected NHIC beneficiaries with fatal and non-fatal
diseases differently. The interaction coefficient for the
hospital expenditure was 0.386, which suggests that the
hospital expenditure per case was affected with fatal and
non-fatal diseases differently by policy implementation.
Additionally, the result of Table 4 indicates that the
degree of change in the highest premium level was
smaller than that in the lower premium levels. Lower,
lower middle and middle premium group’s inpatients
days and hospital expenditure per case were greatly de-
creased in comparison to those of the high premium
group after policy implementation.
Discussion
This study evaluated the effect of the copayment waiver
policy on hospitalized children under the age of 6 years.
However, the effects of the copayment waiver policy onTable 3 Regression analysis results of comparison of national h
after copayment waiver policy implementation





Type of medical institute
Tertiary hospital and General hospital 0.192a 0.191a
Hospital 0.080a 0.074a
Clinic - -
Etc. (Dental hospital, Health center,
Oriental medical clinic)
−0.439a −0.418a
Fatal disease 0.426a 0.430a
Group (Ref: medical aids group) −0.428a −0.452a
Time −0.125a −0.127a
Group*time (difference in difference estimator) 0.101a 0.104a
R2 0.102 0.108
aP-value < 0.05.NHIC beneficiaries remain unclear after performing this
analysis. The copayment waiver policy was associated
with a smaller decrease in the number of inpatient days
among NHIC beneficiaries than among medical aid
beneficiaries. In contrast, NHIC beneficiaries showed a
greater decrease in hospital expenditure than did medical
aid beneficiaries after implementation of the copayment
waiver policy. Therefore, the net effect of the copayment
waiver policy was not clear.
The effects of copayment have been evaluated in various
studies [13-15]. For example, implementation of copay-
ment among Medicaid beneficiaries changed treatment
pattern, though the total expenditure was not changed.
The use and cost of pharmacy decreased but those of in-
patients increased [16]. Also the increasing copayment for
cancer patients resulted in the decrease of pharmacy cost
and the increase of emergency room visit [17]. In case of
emergency room visit, imposing copayment did not
change the use of emergency room visit or inpatients care
[18]. For ambulatory care, the implementation of copay-
ment resulted in a reduction in the demand for ambula-
tory care, especially in low-economic-status areas [19]. Butealth insurance beneficiaries and medical aid beneficiaries
Hospital expenditure per case
er Self-employed Total Industrial worker Self-employed
1.777a 11.874a 11.858a 11.929a
−0.008a 0.051a 0.053a 0.044a
−0.018a 0.115a 0.118a 0.103a
0.197a 1.096a 1.101a 1.085a
0.100a 0.328a 0.309a 0.378a
- - - -
−0.408a −0.139a −0.216a 0.028
0.418a 0.557a 0.564a 0.536a
−0.393a −0.177a −0.178a −0.188a
−0.125a 0.035a 0.039a 0.023a
0.104a −0.123a −0.133a −0.097a
0.105 0.354 0.364 0.329
Table 4 Effects of copayment waiver policy implementation according to disease severity among National Health
Insurance beneficiaries
Variable Inpatient days per case Hospital expenditure per case
Total Industrial worker Self-employed Total Industrial worker Self-employed
Intercept 1.296a 1.254a 1.339a 11.724a 11.696a 11.769a
Gender −0.004a −0.002 −0.007a 0.051a 0.053a 0.046a
Age −0.018a −0.020a −0.017a 0.114a 0.118a 0.104a
Type of Medical Institute
Tertiary hospital and General hospital 0.189a 0.188a 0.193a 1.078a 1.084a 1.066a
Hospital 0.075a 0.066a 0.090a 0.310a 0.288a 0.351a
Clinic - - - - - -
Etc. (Dental hospital, Health center,
Oriental medical clinic)
−0.473a −0.469a −0.481a −0.184a −0.281a −0.027
Fatal disease 0.370a 0.373a 0.365a 0.331a 0.329a 0.332a
Premium level
Lower 0.114a 0.147a 0.111a 0.088a 0.102a 0.092a
Lower middle 0.109a 0.135a 0.088a 0.080a 0.096a 0.066a
Middle 0.078a 0.098a 0.066a 0.055a 0.067a 0.046a
High middle 0.040a 0.063a 0.030a 0.022a 0.033a 0.016a
High - - - - - -
Time −0.032a −0.015a −0.037a −0.163a −0.167a −0.148a
Fatal disease*time 0.093a 0.093a 0.092a 0.386a 0.393a 0.370a
Premium level*time
Lower*time −0.036a −0.049a −0.043a −0.044a −0.023a −0.121a
Lower middle*time −0.013a −0.029a −0.003 −0.028a −0.035a −0.021a
Middle*time −0.014a −0.029a −0.003 −0.031a −0.041a −0.014
High middle*time 0.001 −0.013a 0.009 0.000 −0.006 0.013
High*time - - - - - -
R2 0.099 0.102 0.095 0.362 0.373 0.341
aP-value < 0.05.
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ated as limiting in Korea [20]. These data generally fo-
cused on outpatient care and, hospitalization, the number
of relevant studies is limited.
Among NHIC beneficiaries from 0 to 5 years of age in
the present study, the total number of patients increased
by 62.7% and the total number of cases increased by
66.6% after compared with before policy implementa-
tion. After policy implementation, the number of in-
patient days per case decreased by 6.4% and the hospital
expenditure per case decreased by 9.1%. Among the
NHIC beneficiaries, the magnitude of change was bigger
in industrial worker group than in Self-employed. There-
fore, the intensity of health care utilization decreased
with an increase in total health care utilization. This
may have resulted from an increase in medical
utilization, which in turn caused a decrease in the inten-
sity of health care utilization [13]. The trend of medical
aid beneficiaries who were already exempt from thecopayment waiver policy showed similar results during
the same period. The net effect of the policy on this
finding is unclear because the trend of health care inten-
sity decreased. A comparison of NHIC beneficiaries and
medical aid beneficiaries was conducted to estimate the
net effect. In the regression analysis using the “difference
in difference”, the intensity of medical utilization did not
remain consistent. With respect to the number of in-
patient days per case, the NHIC beneficiaries displayed
less negative results than did the medical aid beneficiar-
ies. In other words, the effect of the policy actually in-
creased the number of inpatient days per case. With
respect to the hospital expenditure per case, that of the
NHIC beneficiaries group decreased by more than did
that of the medical aid beneficiaries group, and the pol-
icy did not increase the hospital expenditure per case.
Therefore, it cannot be stated that the copayment waiver
policy changed the intensity of medical utilization [21].
Other studies about copayment implementation also
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cost is mixed. These results imply that the policy on
copayment could result in unintended effects due to the
response of patients and supplier, and should be imple-
mented with considerable caution [16,17].
The interactions between time and the stated variables
were considered in the analysis of the effects of disease
and income level on policy use among NHIC beneficiaries.
According to the regression analysis, patients with fatal
diseases acted differently than did those with non-fatal dis-
eases. The intensity of healthcare utilization increased
after implementation of the copayment waiver policy in
terms of both for the number of inpatient days per case
and the hospital expenditure per case. Because the copay-
ment waiver policy aimed to cover catastrophic events
and hospital expenditure, the increase in the intensity of
health care utilization was appropriately targeted by the
policy. In terms of the income level, the intensity of med-
ical use among the low-, low-middle, and middle-income
groups was negatively affected by the copayment waiver
policy compared with the high-income group. Because
low-income groups are known to be sensitive to cost shar-
ing, this was contradictory to the results of previous stud-
ies [13,14,21]. The deviation from our expectations may
have been due to the inclusion of hospitalized children in
this study.
Before the policy implementation, the intensity of health
care use for NHIC beneficiaries was anticipated. Also
among NHIC beneficiaries, the patients who had a fatal
disease and were low income class were major target of
the policy. But our result show that though the fatal pa-
tients had higher intensity, the intensity of high income
class increased more. Also when compared with medical
aid group, the net effect of policy among NHIC beneficiar-
ies was unclear. Therefore, it is hard to say the purpose of
policy was accomplished.
Several limitations must be considered when interpreting
the results of this study. First, the effect of cost on hospital
care and length of stay is limited [22]. Therefore, the effect
of copayment waiver policy is also restricted. In addition,
when using the difference in difference method, the inter-
vention events must be exempt, and other characteristics
should be similar between the groups to obtain an exact
estimation. In this study, the medical aid beneficiaries
group was poorer and less healthy than was the NHIC
beneficiaries group, and the medical needs of the two
groups were different [23]. Therefore, the estimate of
policy effect could be biased. Also the characteristics of
parents except income were not considered. Additionally,
the accuracy of assessing the income of self-employed
individuals in Korea has been questioned. Because the
premium level was based on the assessed income, our
analysis might have been affected by the inaccuracy of
income assessment.Conclusions
This study involved a natural experiment involving the
copayment waiver policy. The co-payment waiver policy
did not decrease the intensity of health care utilization
compared with that of the medical aid beneficiaries group.
Furthermore, the intensity of medical use increased in
the fatal disease group, but did not improve in the low-
income group. Our studies have important policy implica-
tions in Korea and other countries in terms of the level of
patient cost-sharing of medical costs.
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